An evaluation of management performance at the Liberian bank for development and investment 1965-1982, 1988 by Jones, Marlene A. (Author)
AN EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE 
AT THE LIBERIAN BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT 
AND INVESTMENT 1965-1982 
A DEGREE PAPER 
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
BY 
MARLENE ANNA JONES 





JONES, MARLENE ANNA BBA, University of Liberia, 1979 
An Analysis of Management Performance at the Liberian Bank 
for Development and Investment 196 5-1982 
Adviser: Professor James T. Jones 
Degree Paper dated July 1988 
Tbe primary intent of this degree paper is to exa¬ 
mine and review the operations of the Liberian Bank for 
Development and Investment (LBDI), in order to evaluate the 
overall performance of its management since the bank was 
established in 1965. In this connection, the annual finan¬ 
cial results have been analyzed and the overall direction, 
policies and control of the bank have been evaluated. 
The importance of this subject arises out of the 
critical position which LBDI occupies in the financial 
system of Liberia, and the profound impact which it exerts 
over the economy as the largest provider of medium and long 
term financing for industrial and agricultural development. 
The main sources of information were the Annual 
Reports of the bank and the act which created the LBDI, 
along with published materials on bank management, as well 
as development banking in general. 
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SIGNIFICANT DATES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT 
AND MANAGEMENT OF LBDI 
LBIDI Bank Act passed by the Legislature and 
approved by President William V. S. Tubman. 
The bank was officially opened November 24, 
1965. 
Mr. P. Clarence Parker, Jr. appointed General 
Manager. 
Paul C McCann, an American, appointed President 
and Chief Executive Officer. 
Projects Department established and A. W. Yancy, 
Liberian, appointed Projects Director. 
P. C. Parker, General Manager, succeeded Mr. McCann 
as President/Chief Executive. 
Mr, Eli Saleeby succeeded Mr. Parker as President/ 
Chief Executive Officer. 
LBIDI name changed to LBDI - Liberian Bank for 
Development and Investment. 
April 12, 1980 Military Coup d'etat. In May 1980, 
Ms. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a Liberian, named 
President but resigned three months later. 
In September 1980, Mr. David Vinton and Mr. Mobert 
Titus named President and General Manager, respec¬ 




Social and Economic Factors 
The factors which influence the monetary and finan¬ 
cial arrangement of a country are very complex. To give a 
comprehensive or detailed account of those influences, espe¬ 
cially in the case of Liberia, and to take into considera¬ 
tion the significant historical factors would certainly 
lengthen this paper much beyond what is necessary to deal 
significantly with the primary focus of this study. Never¬ 
theless, it is recognized that no monetary, banking or 
financial system or institution can be adequately under¬ 
stood, let alone constructively analyzed in isolation from 
the society and economy within which and for whose principal 
benefit it operates. The Liberian Bank for Development and 
Investment (LBDI), it must be recognized, though of "mixed 
public and private ownership," owes its origin and unique 
character in the monetary and financial system and history 
of Liberia to the concrete manifestation of the government's 
desire, not for profit, but to meet an important institu¬ 
tional and economic need in the financial structure of the 
country. 
Even though Liberia became politically independent 
in 1847, little economic progress was made until after 
1 
2 
World War II when large deposits of iron ore were dis¬ 
covered and exploitation of those resources began in 1952 } 
Prior to that time, the principal market oriented activity 
was the production of natural rubber in which the Fire¬ 
stone Plantation Company (FPC) was the largest producer 
2 
and sole exporter. Other minor agricultural exports were 
coffee, cocoa, palm kernels and piassava. 
Technically speaking, the banking habit in Liberia 
is still as yet relatively undeveloped, and the banks only 
cater to the marginal needs of the population as a whole. 
The check is, of course, not widely used since it still 
remains true that for much of the rural population, which 
is largely illiterate, organized banking arrangements 
scarcely exist. The effect of this is, first, a relatively 
restricted use of bank credit; second, the direct employ¬ 
ment of cash (i.e., coins and notes) for the majority of 
monetary transactions; and third, and even more obviously 
beyond the influence of banking institutions, a host of 
transactions which are consumated in kind, i.e., in non¬ 
monetary terms or barter. 
Despite significant strides during the Tubman- 
Tolbert administrations, the extension of banking 
1 
Abayomi Karnga, History of Liberia (Liverpool: 
D. H. Tyce, 1962), p. 15. 
^Ibid. 
3 
facilities to the rural areas in particular is still in 
its infancy. There are several problems which have mili¬ 
tated against a more rapid development of branch banking. 
For the established commercial banks,, essentially, it is a 
matter of low profitability. In fact, Citibank, Bank of 
Liberia and Chase Manhattan have established branches at 
various times outside Monrovia but have found it necessary 
to close them. In many instances, the Bank of Liberia and 
Chase Manhattan acquired the branches of Citibank. The 
lack of adequate facilities, communication, transportation 
and electricity and the small local market have combined 
to make institutional banking very costly. 
Structural Characteristics of the 
Monetary and Financial System 
Liberia has a relatively "open economy" and it is 
the private sector that dominates in most fields of eco- 
3 
nomic activity. There is complete freedom of movement of 
funds between Liberia and the rest of the world since 
Liberia has no currency notes of its own. However, it has 
a two-track monetary system in which U.S. currency notes 
circulate together with Liberian coins issued in denomina¬ 
tions of one cent, five cents, ten cents, twenty-five 
3 
Liberia, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, 
Second National Socioeconomic Development Plan of Liberia, 
1981-1985 (Monrovia, Liber ia : Sabanon Press, 1980) , 34 . 
4 
cents, one dollar and five dollars, both forming the legal 
4 
tender of the country. The currency notes in circulation 
in Liberia are thus not only a medium of exchange but also 
a foreign asset. This imparts a unique character to the 
Liberian economy. 
Between 1956 and 1965 the commercial banks in the 
country increased from two to seven.^ However, the avail¬ 
ability of medium and long term credit was still severely 
limited. By 1962, Liberia had broadened its borrowing pos¬ 
sibilities to include countries other than the United 
States and had acquired membership in the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and had become concurrently the driving force in pro¬ 
moting a regional development finance institution—the 
African Development Bank which is located in the Ivory 
g 
Coast. 
Recognizing the need to take advantage of the 
opportunities for mobilizing resources to assist the develop¬ 
ment needs, particularly of the private sector, the Libe¬ 
rian Bank for Development and Investment (LBDI), was 
4Ibid. 
^Ibid., p. 35. 
6 
5 
granted its charter by the Liberian Legislature in 2961, 
It should be kept isn mind that the financial system 
has attempted to grow along with the needs of the Liberian 
people, and also with the development stages of the country. 
Today, the Central Bank or the National Bank of Liberia 
CNÎL) as it is called, heads the financial system in Liberia 
and is fully owned by the government. There are seven other 
banking institutions, of which five are branches of foreign 
commercial banks and the remaining two are of Liberian 
origin. These two are of a specialized nature and are in¬ 
tended to fill the gaps arising from the reluctance of the 
commercial banks to extend agricultural credit and/or medium 
and long term loans to local business for the establishment 
or expansion of manufacturing enterprises. 
Background Data on the Establishment 
of the Liberian Bank for Development 
and Investment 
The Liberian Bank for Development and Investment 
formally referred to as the Liberian Bank for Industrial De¬ 
velopment and Investment (LBEDI) was created as a statutory 
corporation under legislation in 1961 with an amendment being 
made in 1962, and two amendments being made in 1963 just 
before the bank formally opened to the public for 
6 
7 business on November 24, 1965. The name of the bank was 
changed from LBIDI to LBDI in 1972 to reflect a broadening 
of its aims and objectives to include specifically the 
financing of agricultural and agro-industrial enterprises. 
According to its statute, the broad purpose of the 
Liberian Bank for Development and Investment is to: 
... assist in the establishment, expansion, and 
modernization of the private productive business 
and industrial enterprises in Liberia; to encou¬ 
rage and promote the development of internal and 
external private and public capital availabili¬ 
ties in the financing of such enterprises; to 
encourage, sponsor and facilitate private estab¬ 
lishments, acquisition or ownership of productive 
businesses and industrial development, and secu¬ 
rities . 8 
To achieve these objectives, the bank was given authority 
to make long and medium term loans, subscribe to equity 
capital of local enterprises, act as a guarantor, under¬ 
write, revolve its portfolio, supply technical assistance 
and undertake promotional activities. 
The resources of LBDI at the time consisted of one 
million ($1,000,000) dollars in authorized shared capital, 
represented by 100,000 shares with a par value of $10.00 
each. The share capital was divided into two classes; 
Class A shares, which must always be a majority (about 51 
percent) of the common stock and which can be held only by 
7LBDI, General Information Bulletin (Monrovia, 
Sabonah Press, 1965), p. 1. 
®Ibid., p. 3. 
Liberia : 
7 
Liberian citizens or corporations, the Government of 
Liberia, international institutions and others qualified 
under appropriate regulations; and Class -B shares of 
approximately 49 percent which may be owned by a person 
9 
or entity. These two classes of shares are equal in 
other respects, with each being represented by one-half 
of the Board of Directors.^ 
In addition to the one million dollar share capi¬ 
tal, the government granted the bank a loan of one million 
dollars for lending purposes. This was an interest-free 
loan, and it was subordinated to all debts and paid-up 
capital. The loan was given for a term of thirty years, 
and was represented by promissory notes bearing interest 
of 6.5 percent^ per annum. It was agreed that the govern¬ 
ment would redeem the notes for cash in ten equal yearly 
installments beginning 1975. Thus far, all installment 
payments have been made. The government did agree to con¬ 
sider sympathetically any request by LBDI for accelerated 
redemption should the bank require additional cash resources 
to carry on its investment activities. 
A significant financial advantage for the bank 
shareholders, as stated in the act, is that the shares 
9 
Ibid., p. 5 . 
10_. . , Ibid. 
"^Ibid. , p. 9. 
8 
owned by the government (LDC) will not earn any dividend 
until a 6 percent cash dividend has been paid to other 
12 
shareholders. This income, along with interest or divi¬ 
dend which the bank pays, are tax-exempt under the same law. 
Most of the shareholders, as shown in table 1, are 
institutions or individuals operating in Libera. Among 
these are the Liberian Development Corporation .(LDC) which 
was, until 1980, an independent agency of the Liberian 
government in whose name the government's shares were 
originally held. On the other hand, all Class B share¬ 
holders are non-Liberian institutions, except the LAMCO 
Joint Venture, which is mixed and all except the Institute 
Mobiliare (Italian) are institutions operating in Liberia. 
Regarding the ownership of stock, the intention was 
that as soon as practicable, private Liberian investors, 
whom the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the 
Liberian Development Corporation were substituting for 
should get an opportunity to own all of LBDI1s Class A 
shares. The government had already declared through the 
LBDI Act its intention to "encourage and promote activelv 
the distribution of ownership of Class A shares," and, in 
order to facilitate such distribution, to hold its shares 




13 Ibid., p. 11. 
9 
TABLE 1 
OWNERSHIP OF LBDI BY NUMBER OF SHARES 
AND DOLLAR VALUE 
Class A 













Liberian Mining Company 
*LAMCO Joint Venture 












*LAMCO : Liberian American Mining Company 
Currency: United States Dollar 
Source: Liberia, Act of the Liberian Bank for In¬ 
dustrial Development and Investment (LBIDI), April 1969 
(Monrovia, Liberia: Sabanoh Press, Ltd., n.d.), p. 4. 
10 
entered into an agreement with LDC and the government to 
do the same. 
Administrative Structure 
Under the Act of incorporation, the Board of Direc¬ 
tors may have between eight and sixteen directors, pro¬ 
vided that the number of directors should always be even. 
The Liberian Development Corporation is not entitled to 
have more than one director representing it, and not more 
than two directors may be officers of the government. 
Board members are elected annually, one-half by each class 
through separate ballots under a system of "cumulative 
14 voting" within the class. A majority of the board forms a 
quorum and decisions are made by simple majority, with the 
chairman of the board having a deciding vote, in the event 
of a tie. Below is a breakdown of the membership of the 
directorate. 
Two members representing the Government of 
Liberia 
One member representing the Government of 
Liberia and the International Finance 
Corporation 
One member representing International Finance 
Corporation 




Seven members representing the Class B 
shareholders 
The administrative or organizational structure of 
the bank is outlined in its fundamental charter arid by¬ 
laws which provide for three senior officers. They are 
the president or chief executive officer, a deputy or 
general manager and a comptroller. The bylaws delegate 
authority to management and the board to appoint addi¬ 
tional officers as may be required for the efficient and 
smooth operation of the bank. The result of this autho¬ 
rity is seen in the following illustration, figure 1. 
This is the organizational chart from 1965-1971. To date, 
the structure of the chart is basically the same, with the 
exception of the following changes. The comptroller's 
office has been shifted directly under the general manager, 
whereas before, it was separated. 
During the early years, legal assistance was pro¬ 
vided by external sources; now a department has been 
created within the bank to handle this aspect of opera¬ 
tion. Furthermore, a newly established department added 
to the to the organizational chart is the Implementation 
Department which has been combined with the Department of 
Supervision. Please refer to figure 2 to note these 
changes. 
12 
Figure 1. Organizational Chart 1965-1971 
Source: Liberia, Act of the Liberian Bank for Development arid 
and Investment, 1969 (Monrovia, Liberia: Sabanoh Press, Ltd., n.d.), 
p. 11. 
13 
Figure 2. Present Organizational Chart 
Source: LBDI, General Information Report of LBDI, 1982 
(Monrovia, Liberia: Sabanoh Press, Ltd., n.d.), p. 11. 
II. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 
This section provides a summary of the operating 
policies of the bank in order to set out a framework in 
which the bank must function, as well as to give a sense 
of the direction in which the bank is headed. Later dis¬ 
cussion will focus on the role of LBDI in the financial 
system of the country with regards to national develop¬ 
ment. The impact which LBDI exerts on the economy will 
also be analyzed. This will provide a basis for deter¬ 
mining whether the needs of the locally-owned businesses 
are being met, and to see where LBDI fits in the financial 
system of the country. The last part of this section pre¬ 
sents a statement of the problem. 
First of all, the operating policies are the ground 
rules that expand or confine the bank's activities to par¬ 
ticular fields or geographic areas which prescribe an 
order of priority among economic sectors. In addition, 
these policies give a breakdown of the nature of encourag- 
ment, promotion and sponsorship which it offers to achieve 
the objectives of the bank. 
An examination of the policies by the writer indi¬ 
cates that refinancing operations are prohibited as well 
14 
15 
as the financing of import-export trade and other commer¬ 
cial banking activities, but LBDI is able to assist not 
merely industrial enterprises but also "agricultural" or 
service-oriented projects associated with or contributing 
15 to manufacturing enterprises. Though its assistance is 
to be available only for enterprises that are privately 
owned and operated, it also renders assistance to enter¬ 
prises in which the government's participation is 25 per¬ 
cent or less. 
LBDI practices the observance of rules of financial 
prudence by diversifying its investments and by adopting 
limitations on the volume of its commitments to any one 
particular type of investment. Furthermore, LBDI will 
revolve its portfolio whenever it can do so on satisfac¬ 
tory terms. In other words, from time to time it will 
change the mix of its investment activities as the need 
arises. By doing this, the bank will be able to increase 
its yearly earnings. LBDI also practices the maintenace 
of adequate reserves. In regards to foreign exchange, 
LBDI’s policy is not to assume the foreign exchange risk 
on its foreign loans. As a rule of financial prudence 
regarding diversification of financing, the management has 
taken a standard position as expressed by the viewpoints 
15 Ibid., p. 15 . 
16 
that follow: 
Investment in loan and equity participation 
in any one enterprise shall not exceed an 
amount equivalent to 10 percent of the Libe¬ 
rian Bank for Development and Investment's 
total resources.^6 
Investment in the equity of any single one 
enterprise shall not exceed 10 percent of 
LBDI's paid-in share capital and free re¬ 
serves . 
The aggregate value of all investments com¬ 
puted at cost, and the equity of all enter¬ 
prises shall at no time exceed the aggregate 
of the paid-in capital and free reserves of • 
the Bank.!6 
Investment in the form of both loan and equity 
by the Bank shall normally not exceed 50 percent 
of the total assets of the enterprises. In the 
form of equity alone, the Bank's participation 
shall not exceed 25 percent of the equity of the 
enterprise.!9 
These policies are aimed at protecting the resources of 
the bank as well as minimizing the risks involved in the 
financing of activities. 
The critical importance of LBDI to the Liberian 
economy and the impact which it exerts on the economy is 
vital to the national development of the country as a 
whole. Discussion of its significance is as follows. The 
position which LBDI occupies in the financial system is 






important because it is the first Liberian financial insti¬ 
tution to provide medium and long term financing. Being 
the first financial institution of its nature in the coun¬ 
try, LBDI was initially faced with a challenge to prove 
itself in two ways. First of all, it was responsible for 
assisting in economic programming and development of indus¬ 
trial activities, and to promote a capital market in the 
country. At the same time, sound economic banking prac¬ 
tices were required to be maintained. By assisting in 
economic programming and development of industrial activi¬ 
ties, LBDI would open up new avenues of business activities 
financing, enlarge the variety of skills of the labor force 
and entrepreneurial groups as well as expand the scale and 
scope of existing enterprises. To accomplish this task, 
LBDI would encourage the development of private production 
enterprises by providing medium and long term loans (up to 
20 a maximum of fifteen years) and equity financing. This 
combination of banking and developmental criteria in in¬ 
vestment decisions differentiates LBDI from other banks in 
the country, including commercial banks. LBDI will not 
achieve its developmental objectives if it devotes limited 
capital exclusively to "bankable" projects irrespective of 
their purpose; at the same time, it cannot afford regularly 
20 Ibid., p. 21. 
18 
to ignore the financial aspects of proposals and thereby- 
run the risk of failing to justify its name as the Liberian 
21 Bank for Development and Investment. This makes it 
imperative that projects subject to sound investment cri¬ 
teria with as broad a geographical base as possible are 
selected for financing. Although the bank is suited and 
oriented to financing on a large scale, small businesses 
are not neglected. 
Unlike commercial banks, whose main source of cap¬ 
ital depends on demand and time deposits placed by indivi- 
tuals in anticipation of immediate or possible future 
need, LBDI obtains most of its capital by borrowing from 
local insurance companies and international financing organi¬ 
zations such as the African Development Bank (ADB), Euro¬ 
pean Investment Bank (EIB), and the Liberian public. 
Statement of the Problem 
The problems to be addressed in this paper will 
focus on two areas. The first problem is related to the 
composition of the board of directors and the second one 
pertains to the operation of the bank. 
Since it is the board of directors that is ulti¬ 
mately responsible for the bank's reputation and standards, 
21 Ibid. 
19 
the composition of its membership is crucial to the success 
of the bank. It is necessary that some of its members have 
the experience and working knowledge, as well as the tech¬ 
nical knowledge in the field of development banking. 
By law, the board constitutes the supreme governing 
body whose membership represents the majority shareholders 
in the bank. These are the Government of Liberia and the 
International Finance Company, whose combined shareholding 
is 51 percent, and the other shareholders—Citibank N.A., 
International Trust Company, Firestone Plantation Company 
and Instituto Mobilaire Italiano of Italy. The representa¬ 
tives of the Liberian government are the Minister of Finance 
and the Deputy Minister for Banking and Fiscal Affairs who 
serves as Chairman of the Board. The first board was 
elected by the International Finance Company and other 
shareholders and it consisted of nine members. The board, 
in turn, elects an Executive Committee of four from among 
its members to whom are delegated the authority to take 
actions during the intervening periods between board meetings 
and make credit decisions on specified amounts. At present 
the board consists of fourteen members. 
The four members of the Executive Committee include 
the Chairman of the Board, the World Bank representative, 
and the Citibank and International Trust Company represen¬ 
tatives. One basic problem which has been encountered from 
20 
time to time since the establishment of the Executive Com¬ 
mittee is that decisions are made unanimously. Essentially, 
this means that each director, or more precisely, each member 
of the committee can exercise defacto veto power over its 
deliberations. In other words, any single member of this 
committee can paralyze the activity of the bank. This rule 
of unanimity in decision-making by the Executive Committee 
results in a paralysis of that body from time to time. And, 
as a result, credit and other proposals have to be referred 
to the board, which meets infrequently. Hence, the tradi¬ 
tional function of the board, i.e., the review of policy 
making areas are then expanded to include credit operations. 
During these times, the creditability of the bank is seri¬ 
ously undermined since the prospective borrowers and spon¬ 
sors of projects have to wait two to three years before a 
decision about their proposals can be obtained from the bank 
Based on reviews, including background information 
about each board member, in the general information bul¬ 
letins, the members of the Executive Committee were experi¬ 
enced bankers; nevertheless, their training and work experi¬ 
ence as commercial bankers were impediments in their évalua 
tion of development projects. In other words, they were 
accustomed to making credit decisions on short term, self- 
liquidating proposals which were fully collaterized. Conse¬ 
quently, the built-in prejudices and philosophical 
21 
orientation of commercial banking exhibited themselves in a 
predictable negative response to development oriented pro¬ 
jects. This in essence was the same problem experienced by 
the Board of Directors regarding its composition. 
The second problem identified by the writer pertains 
to the operation of the bank and has to do with the selection 
criteria for projects. Considering the nature of its objec¬ 
tives, LBDI has no single criterion or rule for selecting 
projects. This process is in addition influenced by econo¬ 
mic and socio-political factors such as employment opportu¬ 
nities, expansion of local businesses, risk exposure and the 
need for industrial development. 
Unlike the commercial banks which are purely finan¬ 
cial institutions for which earnings are the exclusive test 
of economic efficiency, LBDI cannot reduce all the ingre¬ 
dients of investment decisions to a single measurable stan¬ 
dard. As a bank, it is concerned with the financial results 
of investment and the consequences for their income state¬ 
ments and balance sheet. In this aspect of its role, it 
also applies conventional financial tests to appraise risks 
and expected returns; the technical and financial soundness 
of the project, the profit history of the enterprise, the 
enterprise's capital structure, the value and liquidity of 
assets available as security, etc. But at the same time, 
as a development organization, LBDI should be concerned with 
the total impact of the project on the community, regardless 
22 
of whether it is reflected in the enterprise's financial 
accounts. In most instances, this has not been the practice. 
Based on the auditors' comments in the 10th Annual Report of 
IB PIr it was noted that most projects financed by LBDI had 
the tendency to lean toward financial considerations. This 
is partly because the value of the benefits to be derived 
from these projects cannot be estimated or captured so as to 
rank these projects on a single scale or priority, and partly 
because of the diffusion of their benefits throughout the com¬ 
munity. 
III. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The review of the literature is divided into four 
sections. First, a look at the general purpose and types of 
development banks, followed by recruitment of management per-, 
sonnel, then board-management relationships. The fourth sec¬ 
tion deals with operational procedure and staff. 
The writer examined the works of several authors on 
the subject matter in general which include Shirley Boskey's 
Problems and Practices of Development Banking, Phillips 
Perera's Development Finance, John A. King, Jr.'s Economic 
Development Projects and their Appraisal, but relied heavily 
on the text by J. T. Houk, Financing and Problems of Develop¬ 
ment Banking. 
Purposes and Types of 
Development Banks 
In general, development banks are visualized as vehi¬ 
cles for promoting agro-industrial financing activities. 
The success of these institutions in stimulating new invest¬ 
ments in and by the private sector, and in making available 
new skills and enterprises as well as capital, have proved 
their value as instruments o.f economic development in their 
22 
rights. Because each bank is a response to the particular 
2 2 J. T. Houk, Financing and Problems of Development 
Banking (New York: Frederick A Praeger, iÿbV) , p7 K~. 
23 
24 
needs of the country which it serves, and to the political, 
economic and social environment in which it functions, there 
is considerable variety among them, particularly in scope of 
23 
activity. This is also true even in the case where there 
may be two or more development banks in one particular coun¬ 
try. Most are public institutions, owned and managed by the 
government. Several are owned jointly by the government and 
private capital, the latter generally having a minority in¬ 
terest. LBDI falls within the latter category. There are 
a few that are also privately owned and controlled. 
Some development banks play a major role in the 
financial system of their respective countries as financing 
institutions; for others, providing finance is of less sig¬ 
nificance.^ A few are the primary source of capital for 
government undertakings as well as for the private sector. 
Some assist industrial enterprises exclusively, while others 
also finance large-scale commercial agriculture, or agri¬ 
cultural undertakings integrated with a manufacturing opera¬ 
tion as is the case with LBDI. Within the industrial sec¬ 
tor, normally only manufacturing or processing enterprises 
are eligible for assistance, but a few banks are prepared to 
25 
finance service industries or housing projects. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid., P- 11. 
2^Ibid., P- 13. 
Many 
25 
concentrate on medium and large-scale Industries; others haye 
been created expressly to cater to the needs of small enter¬ 
prises. Xn general, development banks are free to provide 
funds in whatever form seems most appropriate—by equity 
participation, or loans, or some intermediate form of invest- 
. 26 roents. 
A review of the literature reveals that many develop¬ 
ment banks provide their clients with technical assistance 
or management advice on projects they finance, while others 
provide advice on projects even if they do not finance them. 
Still other institutions offer no technical assistance, even 
to clients. Of critical importance in determining whether or 
not technical advice is provided are much factors as national 
27 
economic priority, technical capability and costs. Also 
included among the activities of development is promoting 
a capital market, while actively seeking to broaden the base 
of industrial ownership by selling investments from their 
portfolios, by underwriting industrial issues, or more indi- 
2 8 
rectly, by issuing their own securities. In a few in¬ 
stances, development banks have been made responsible for 
the general economic programming for the country in which 







ultimate goal is the expansion of the country's possibili- 
29 
ties for self-sustaining economic growth. 
Recruitment of Management Personnel 
Based on the literatùre review, the word management 
is susceptible to many definitions. A definition that seems 
particularly applicable to the context of this paper is: 
"Management is the art of getting work accomplished through 
the organized efforts of other people. 
Although the functions to be performed by management 
are often clearly spelled out in the charter of most develop¬ 
ment banks, this by itself, no matter how conscientiously 
they have been complied with, does not insure the bank's suc¬ 
cess, even in the most favorable of economic circumstances. 
Arrangements must be made for capable and experienced manage¬ 
ment. The importance of this statement is further stressed 
by Phillips Perera in his text. It is one of the most im¬ 
portant parts of a development bank's operation. The bank 
should insure that a qualified staff is recruited for its 
31 
activities. If this is not done, a bank may not qualify 
as a true development institution and soon will lose support 
30Ibid., p. 21. 
31 Phillips Perera, Development Finance Institutions, 
Problems and Prospects (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 
1974) , p. 191. 
27 
32 from concessionary sources of funds. This has been one of 
the critical drawbacks of LBDI. With competent management, 
a bank may be successful, notwithstanding inadequacies in 
the original concept of the institution, or flaws within 
33 its organa.c structure and the shortcomings of its charter. 
But no bank, however well conceived, can overcome the handi¬ 
cap of poor management.^ 
The chief executive officer is considerd as the most 
important-member of management. In the case of LBDIy. he 
carries the title of President. He is responsible for the 
day-to-day operations under the policies and guidance of the 
board of directors. 
According to most sources on development banking, it 
is usually extremely difficult to find a good chief executive 
officer for a new development bank, and it is not much easier 
to do so after the bank's reputation has been established. 
The position calls for experience in long-term industrial 
financing, combined with such personal characteristics as 
energy, imagination and tack and an ability to withstand 










Ibid., p. 24 . 
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Management in this case calls for skills so different from 
those employed in project appraisal or in loan administra¬ 
tion that there are not many persons with the requisite 
qualifications, even in the industrialized countries, and 
far fewer in developing or Third World countries like 
Liberia. 
Often times, foreign investors will offer assistance 
to recruit a chief executive officer and most likely that 
3 6 individual will be a non-national of that country. This 
is one of the difficulties encountered in the process. In a 
situation or country where it may be impossible to find a 
qualified local national, particularly in a country like 
Liberia, which has had very little experience in long-term 
industrial financing or indeed no experience in industry, 
one would think that the idea of recruiting a foreign 
national to fill such a position would override all other 
considerations. If private shareholders of LBDI were given 
satisfactory assurance that the operations of the bank are 
in good hands, they would not be so reluctant to commit 
themselves as is usually the case and this is only normal. 
Even local private investors may equate competence with 
imported talent at the start. 
In the case of Liberia, the decision to engage a 
non-national at the time the bank was established was 
36 Ibid. 
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politically difficult and still is since the emphasis of the 
government in regards to the financial system is on qetting 
more Liberians involved in managerial positions and to par¬ 
ticipate in the decision making process. Hence, since there 
were experienced and qualified bankers available, althouqh 
not in the area of development banking, those individuals 
were given the opportunity to start the operations of such 
a financial institution. 
A consideration which probably delayed the appoint¬ 
ment of an expatriate in Liberia might have been the fact 
that a non-national would have had to be offered remuneration 
substantially higher than that paid even to a local national 
in most administrative positions in the country. This was 
expected since the salary level which he could command was 
higher in relation to the salary scale of a developing coun¬ 
try like Liberia. Added to this were the tax considerations. 
The chief executive officer's remuneration may be subject to 
a tax at home as well as in the country of employment. How¬ 
ever, whenever the government of Liberia has to recruit a 
foreign national for such needed key positions, the govern¬ 
ment usually grants tax exemptions to relieve the tax burden. 
According to most sources on development banking, most banks 
have been urged not to make compensation the principal fac¬ 
tor in their employment decisions. As such, banks should not 
show an unwillingness to meet the legitimate salary demands 
30 
of a qualified and competent candidate. A single wrong 
decision attributable to inexperience or poor judgment could 
cost a bank considerably much more difficulty and/or actual 
monetary loss than the amount saved in the manager's remun¬ 
eration. Thus, even though LBDI commenced operation in 
1965, a chief executive officer (CEO) was not appointed 
until April 1967 when M. Paul C. McCann, an American, was 
37 appointed to that position for a two-year term. Mr. 
McCann had arrived in Liberia two years earlier as head of a 
team of consultants for the United States Agency for Inter¬ 
national Development (USAID) Technical Assistance Program 
and was assigned to the Liberian Development Corporation, a 
parastatal entity. Mr. McCann's services were funded under 
the technical assistance program of USAID in Liberia . 
A Liberian counterpart, Mr. P. Clarence Parker, Jr., 
was appointed General Manager and subsequently succeeded to 
the presidency at the expiration of Mr. McCann's tenure in 
3 8 
1970. Mr. Parker had been educated in the United States 
where he earned an MBA degree from New’ York University. He 
had first gained managerial experience in the organization 
3 7 
LBDI, Tenth Annual Report and Accounts, 1965-1975 




and management of the Agricultural Credit Corporation (ACC), 
a parastatal entity which was designed to provide financinq 
for small scale farmers. In addition, Mr. Parker had also 
demonstrated a high level of entrepreneurial talent through 
his organization and successful management of Parker Paints, 
Inc., which became a household name in Liberia and other 
neighboring countries--Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast 
Finally, the first management team of LBDI included 
Mr. Mobert Titus, as comptroller, and in 1968 the Projects 
Department was created with A. William Yancy, a financial 
economist (with anM.A. degree from Columbia University, New 
39 York City), as Projects Manager. Thus, LBDI became fully 
operational for the first time in 1968 though it came into 
. . . , , . 40 
existence three years earlier. 
Board-Management Relationship 
All institutions have to be built around the charac¬ 
teristics and capacities of the people who are then avail- 
4 1 
able. Furthermore, an institution's structure, which may 
be entirely appropriate with a particular group of indivi¬ 
duals, may be impracticable if other individuals were substi 
tuted. Duties and responsibilities and functions, therefore 
3 9 
Ibid., p. 11. 
40T, . , Ibid . 
4 1 J. T. Houk, Financing and Problems of Development 
Banking , p. 33. 
32 
must be shifted from time to time to meet changing condi¬ 
tions and needs of the institution itself and the public 
42 which it serves. It is agreed that the success of an in- 
43 stitution lies in the management's ability to innovate. 
Like any other organization, a development bank must work 
out the relationship between the group which sets policy—the 
board of directors and those responsible for carrying out 
policies once established—the management. The reference 
made by John A. King, Jr. regarding the relationship between 
the board and management as stated becomes very clear in the 
operating phase. One of the most common questions asked is 
the extent to which responsibility and authority should be 
44 delegated or centralized. The answer depends on the scale 
of operation of the institution, geographical dispersion, 
the degree of specialization of personnel and the number of 
45 
persons to whom responsibility can be delegated. 
According to several of the published sources men¬ 
tioned, experience has shown that it is essential for effec¬ 
tive operation of any bank that the directors have full con¬ 
fidence in the chief executive officer of the bank and that 
they neither insist upon re-examining issues with which he 
4^ibid. 
44John A. King, Jr., Economic Development Projects 
and Their Appraisal (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 
1967), p. 10. 
45Ibid. 
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has already deàlt nor issue new directives on details of 
operations. In other words, management must, in short, 
have full authority to run the bank. A really competent 
chief executive officer will want to make decisions and 
assume the responsibility for them. 
At the same time, if the board of directors is not 
to abdicate its function, it must retain responsibility for 
46 general policy decisions. Delegation of unlimited autho- 
47 rity would be inconsistent with the board's responsibility. 
Moreover, it would not be fair to the chief executive offi¬ 
cer, for it would expose him to all sorts of pressure which 
48 he might find difficult to resist. It is the primary 
function of the board, although not usually spelled out in 
the charter, to give support to the chief executive officer 
in his dealings with clients and to stand between him and 
the public. This is relevant regardless of whether the 
chief executive officer is foreign or a local national. 
Another concern of the relationship betwen board and 
management is the extent to which each participates in in¬ 










practice for the chief executive to sift applications. Those 
which are outside the bank's authority, which are not conso¬ 
nant with its policy, etc. can be rejected out of hand. 
Others may be found wanting for technical or financial 
inadequacies. Board of directors do not normally or are not 
normally supposed to review applications which the chief 
executive officer has concluded should be rejected for 
49 reasons such as these. For the most part, they confine 
their deliberations to proposals which he has recommended and 
to applications presenting new issues of policy.^ 
Because of the size of the boards of some banks, 
often times it is not feasible for the board to consider 
and act upon all applications which the chief executive 
officer has found favorable. In such a situation, the chief 
executive officer would take final action on proposals in 
some circumstances -or refer these applications to the appro- 
51 
priate committee concerned with handling them. To assure 
that no decisions are made by reason of personal bias, these 
banks have made provisions for periodic review by the full 
board of directors of actions taken in its name by the chief 





52Ibid., p. 36. 
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For instance, the Management Credit Committee, of 
which the Chief Executive Officer of LBDI is chairman,.may 
approve proposed project financing aggregating no more than 
$50,000. Proposals in excess of this amount are reviewed by 
the Executive Committe of the Board and require their ap¬ 
proval. Loans for more than this specified amount and all 
proposals for equity financing must be considered by the 
Board. Initially, all projects required the approval of the 
Board or a four-member Executive Committee which is comprised 
of the representatives of Citibank, NA._\ and International 
Trust Company of Liberia, the Chief Executive Officer of 
the Bank and the Minister of Finance or his designated repre¬ 
sentative . 
The representatives of these institutions were their 
local chief operation officers in the persons of Walter 
Jennings and Henry Conway, each of whom had spent more than 
four years in Monrovia as head of their commercial banking 
operations. To stress the significance which their presence 
had on the operations of LBDI, it should be mentioned that 
both men had been and were experienced commercial bankers 
whose viewpoints and orientation reflected their professional 
predisposition for short term, self-liquidating loans which 
were adequately collaterized. Initially, the Board made the 
decision that all loans would require consideration of the 
36 
Board which met quarterly, according to the bylaws but which 
did not, in fact, meet as often. 
Operational ’Procedures 
The common practice used by most development banks in 
the lending process is to first interview the applicant to 
determine the eligibility of the project being presented to 
the bank for financing. In the opinion of the interviewer 
or interviewers, if the project seems eligible, a question¬ 
naire designed by the bank would be given to the applicant. 
This begins the initial project report. Based on the prelimi¬ 
nary information provided by the applicant, if the bank de¬ 
cides to go further with the project, a special questionnaire 
tailored to the specific project, will then be given the ap¬ 
plicant for completion. Upon the return of the questionnaire, 
the project will be assigned to an analyst for appraisal by 
the respective manager. Upon completion of the analysis, the 
project is then sent to the appropriate body, either the 
bank's management or a particular committee for review and 
53 
determination of its viability. If there are adjustments 
or corrections to be made, it is then returned to the depart¬ 
ment that handled it initially. When the corrections are 
made, it is forwared to management or the respective com¬ 
mittee for approval, if it is in the approval limits of that 
53 Ibid,, p. 51. 
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body. If not, it is endorsed by that body and forwarded to 
the board for approval. This in essence is basically the 
same procedure practiced by LBDI. As stated in the text by 
John A. King, it is equally important at this point that the 
organization be able to put the decisions of management into 
effect without delay as this would insure timely scheduling 
54 and control of the project. In addition, sound budget and 
inventory controls are needed. Care in this respect is very 
important because in many developing countries, the purposes 
served by these controls, particularly the fucntion served 
55 by preventive maintenance, are not understood. 
Technical Personnel 
The work of appraising applications, investigating 
the economic, financial and technical feasibility of projects 
and undertaking post-financing loan supervision requires the 
services of various kinds of specialists. For this reason, 
some development banks have tried to staff themselves with 
technical personnel, while others have made arrangements for 
technical services without building up a technical staff of 
their own. A few of the sources which provide such services 
include universities, state institutions, private associa¬ 
tions and international organizations such as the 
~*^John A. King, Jr., Economic Development Projects 
and Their Appraisal, p. 11. 
55 Ibid. 
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International Labour Organization, Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), and the U.N. Technical Assistance Admin¬ 
istration. All of these have made available the services of 
one or more staff members to various development banks from 
time to time. 
Nearly all development banks start with a minimum 
technical staff, until the volume of business builds up. In 
the initial stage, this helps to avoid having costly idle 
personnel while the volume of work is still very low. How¬ 
ever, this temptation to postpone building a competent staff 
until the bank is well established and can afford the cost 
and time-consuming process means delaying achievement of the 
5 6 objectives laid out in its charter. In many instances, the 
only available technicians during this time are foreign with 
relatively high salary demands which adds greatly to the 
administrative expenses. 
As time goes on, training becomes one of the most 
important functions of management in regards to the develop¬ 
ment of its staff. Having assessed the staff needs as accu¬ 
rately as possible, it becomes possible to make better plans 
for training requirements. If the staff is considered as the 
bank's main asset, then management must see to it that the 
^ J. T. Houk, Financing and Problems of Development 
Banking, p. 62. 
57Ibid. 
39 
training to be provided will cater to all stages of the indi- 
58 
vidual's development as well as the needs of the bank. 
In the case of LBDI, the decision was made to rely 
upon external agencies and institutions for its technical 
staffing needs. This decision was motivated mainly by cost 
considerations and also by the policy objective of encourag¬ 
ing industrial or manufacturing development. The dependence 
on external technical expertise meant, in the final analysis, 
that the bank lost control over its operation and the develop¬ 
ment of technical experience required for future growth and 
expansion of the bankrs services could not take place. It 
appears that in the early years of LBDI, management seemed 
too preoccupied with commercial profitability rather than 
with the institutional requirements for establishing a sound 
foundation for future growth. This peculiar ordering of its 
priorities was rooted perhaps in the ownership of LBDI and 
the dominant influence which the private sector owners 
exerted over the entire operations of the bank. The manner 
in which this influence was translated into effective opera¬ 
tional control will be discussed later when the relationship 
between the Board of Directors and management is considered. 
58 Ibid. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
To address the issue of management performance as 
it contributes to the success or failure of LBDI in meet¬ 
ing its goals both in terms of profitability and economic 
development, descriptive analysis was utilized. This method 
relies on primary and secondary sources of information. 
Primary information was obtained through participatory obser¬ 
vation, during a period of employment with the Agricultural 
Cooperative and Development Bank in Liberia. This is an¬ 
other development financial institution created by legisla¬ 
tive action. It differs from LBDI in that the focus of its 
objective is on agricultural activities, but faces similar 
problems. Secondary sources of information include annual 
reports of LBDI and publications on development banking, 
particularly in Africa. 
The basic approach in the development of this 
degree paper was to outline certain critical questions 
regarding management performance and to seek answers to 
them. In addition, objective economic and relevant cri¬ 
teria have been established against which to judge the per¬ 
formance of management. In order to do this, a detailed 
review and analysis of the operating performance of LBDI 
have been given, including the period from its founding in 
40 
41 
1965 to 1982, two years after the military coup of April 12, 
1980. An attempt has been made to explain the impact which 
the operating policies, approved by the board and implemented 
by successive managements, have had in determining the direc¬ 
tion and structural development of the bank. The areas of 
operation covered include a review of loan activities of the 
bank, the significance of interest earned on these loans as 
a source of income, the issue of development versus profit¬ 
ability and various policy areas essential to the operation 
of the bank. 
The analysis of loan approval and commitment for the 
first ten years of operation was selected because this 
marked a milestone in the existence of the bank. The obser¬ 
vance of its tenth anniversary had also proven that the bank 
had survived, overcoming most of the problems associated 
with human and financial resource constraints. A review of 
this period, which was most crucial, also indicated that the 
bank would continue to grow and assist in the establishment, 
expansion, and modernization of private productive busi¬ 
nesses and industrial enterprises in Liberia. 
V. AN ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION OF 
THE LIBERIAN BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT 
AND INVESTMENT 
The bank came into existence in 1965 with the enact¬ 
ment of the LBDI Act by the National Legislature and ap¬ 
proval of President W. V. S. Tubman, the 19th President 
of Liberia. This was followed shortly thereafter by the 
appointment of Mr. P. Clarence Parker, Jr., a Liberian, as 
General Manager. Mr. Parker had been largely responsible 
for stimulating interest in government for the creation of 
a specialized development institution after his previous 
experiences with the failed Agricultural Credit Corpora¬ 
tion (ACC) which functioned under the umbrella of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. His association with the ACC 
proved to be a serious obstacle to his efforts to secure 
governmental support in getting LBDI organized, properly 
staffed and functioning. This problem expressed itself 
partly in the form of a lack of confidence by the board to 
empower the general manager to employ or dismiss both pro¬ 
fessional and supporting staff of the bank. The board 
insisted on retaining final authority to hire all profes¬ 
sional staff and the remuneration provided compared very 
favorably with other employment opportunities elsewhere 
42 
43 
in both the private and public sectors. Thus, Mr. Parker 
found himself essentially unable to staff: the bank and 
commence its lending operations for a period of almost two 
years. 
Even if Mr. Parker had succeeded in getting the bank 
properly staffed, progress in terms of an expanding lending 
operation would have been slow. Originally, the bank, or 
Liberian Bank for Industrial Development and Investment 
as it was then called, was intended to provide financing 
for industrial as opposed to agricultural development or 
projects. This initial emphasis on manufacturing enter¬ 
prises reflected both the institutional and popular biases 
of the era. No doubt, it also represented a recognition 
of the high degree of risk and difficulty normally encoun¬ 
tered in agricultural financing, and an attempt by the 
government to achieve some positive results within the 
shortest possible time. After all, a previous attempt to 
provide agricultural finance in the form of the ACC had 
ended in dismal failure. Liberia was still an agricultural 
country, with a very small domestic market for manufac¬ 
turers in 1965. To a significant degree, it still is. 
Hence, part of the problem faced by the newly organized 
bank related to its goals and objectives—industrial 
development. It was not until 1971, after the change in 
government, that the priorities of the bank were broadened 
. 44 
to include agricultural financing. With this change in 
priorities also came a change in the name of the bank from 
Liberian Bank for Industrial Development and Investment to 
Liberian Bank for Development and Investment. 
The rate of progress achieved by LBDI during the 
first decade of its existence can be visualized by refer¬ 
ence to tables 2 and 3 which provide statistical data re¬ 
garding approvals and commitments for the period 1965 to 
1975, and followed by figure 3 indicating graphically 
operational results and loan approvals for the same period 
depicted by figure 4. During the presidency of Mr. McCann, 
1967 to 1970, the commitments of the bank were on the 
average 9.3 percent less than loan approvals, whereas for 
the first decade, commitments were in fact on average 14.1 
59 
percent less than loan approvals. 
Loan Review 
The bank engages in three types of financial acti¬ 
vities: (1) extending loans, (2) the provision of guaran¬ 
tees on behalf of enterprises, and (3) underwriting of 
common shares either on a "best efforts basis" under which 
arrangement the bank simply agrees to market the shares 
and receives a commission in compensation for its services. 
The bank may decide to underwrite or guarantee the sale of 
59LBDI, Tenth Annual Report of LBDI, 1965-1975 
(Monrovia, Liberia: Sabanah Press, Ltd., 19 ), p. 16. 
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TABLE 2 
B R L A K DOWN 01' LBDl’S APPROVALS 
Figures Represent Liberian Dollars - 1965-1975 
Year Loans 
1965   









1975 ' 3,000,536 
Totals : 




203,000 — 767,000 
— — 910,000 
— — 114,000 
26,850 — 443,030 
— — 575,211 
111,500 — 1,328,254 
270,370 — 4,793,290 
72,040 2,033,700 5,106,276 
11,683,301 ??3,76Q 2,033,700 14,492.761 
Source: The Liberian Sank for Development and Investment, Tenth 
Annual Report and Accounts, 1965-1975 (Monrovia, Liberia: Sabanoh Press, 
n.d.), p. 7 
TABLE 3 
BREAK DOWN OF LBOI1S COMMITMENTS, 1965-1975 
Year Loans Equity Guarantees Total Commitments 
1965 — — — — 
1966 — — — — 
1967 160,200 92,000 — 252,200 
1968 763,000 203,000 — 966,000 
1969 743,500 — — 743,500 
1970 193,500 — — 193,500 
1971 185 , 00 0 26,850 — 211,850 
1972 288,700 — — 288,700 
1973 884,615 51,500 — 936,115 
1974 3,119,608 270,370 — 3,389,978 
1975 3,698,112 30,000 1,919,700 5,647,812 
Totals : 
10,036.235 M l.glSfcZSQ 
Source: Thf Liberian Bank for Levelonment and Invs» TcntL 
Annual her'ort ami A, count s . 1 y(ir>- 1 M 7 5 (Monrovia, Liberia: Sab a noli Press, 
n.d. ), P ■ 7 . 
LB.D.I’.S APPROVALS 1965-75 
ECONOMC SECTORS 
Services 



















Source: The Liberian Bank for Development and Investment 
Tenth Annual Report and Accounts, 1965-1975 (Monrovia, Liberia: 




















f9 70 71 72 73 74 75 
PROVISION AGAINST POSSIBLE PORTFOLIO LOSSES PROFIT Egg 
  . OPERATING EXPENSES 
22 
LOSS 
Source: The Liberian Bank for Development and Investment, 
Tenth Annual Report and Accounts, 1965—1975 (Monrovia, Liberia: 
Sabanoh Press, n.d.) 
the shares in which case the par or offered value of the 
shares is paid by the bank, regardless of whether it 
succeeds in selling the shares or not. In the past, the 
bank has shown a far greater disposition towards making 
loans rather than engaging in other investment activities 
due to its desire to limit the risks as much as possible. 
As of December 31, 1982, of the aggregate loans cut- 
6 0 standing, $9.4 million or 44.8 percent, were agricultural. 
This is an indication that L'JDI has expanded its financing 
to include ether areas other than industrial activities. 
The principal projects financed were rubber production, 
palm products, poultry and fishing. Rubber is Liberia's 
principal agricultural export commodity. Included under 
agriculture is forestry and wood processing, which together, 
accounted for 12.4 percent of total loans outstanding at 
the end of 1982.^ In the mid-1970s, LPPI made a signifi¬ 
cant contribution to the expansion of the forestry indus¬ 
tries. As a result, the latter became a major foreign 
exchange earner and one of the principal export items for 
the country. The modernisation of the fishing fleet and 
establishment of fish processing facilities were greatly 
facilitated by L3DI‘s investment in that sector of the 
^ uLBDI, LBDI Annual Report, 198 7 (Monrovia, Liberia: 
Sabanah Press, Ltd., 198 ), p. 30. 
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economy. The Mesurado Fishing Company, a Liberian-owned 
enterprise, expanded its operations to Guinea, Sierra 
Leone and Nigeria. 
With respect to loans, LBDI initially had a slow 
start due partly to the indecision of the board respecting 
the appointment of a chief executive officer on the one 
hand, and the lack of proqress of management in the recruit¬ 
ment of a professional staff, on the other. By the end of 
the first decade, these organizational and start-up prob¬ 
lems had been largely overcome. Thus, by 1974, total loans 
outstanding were $5.2 million, which increased at an aver¬ 
age growth rate of 38 percent per annum during the next 
6 2 two years, rising to $9.7 million at December 31, 1976. 
The growth in loans outstanding this period was due largely 
to expansion in the fishing industry, the wood processing 
and forestry sector in response to world demands and loans 
to improve facilities catering to tourism. Loan demand 
declined in 1977, as the Liberian economy was severely 
impacted by escalating world energy prices and a lowering 
of external demand for primary commodities, Liberia's prin¬ 
cipal exports. During the next two years, 1978 and 1979, 
loans expanded from 10.4 million in 1977 to 15.7 million 
6 2 
LBDI, LBDI Annual Report, 1974 (Monrovia, Liberia: 
Sabanoh Press, Ltd., n.d.), p. 22. 
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by year end 1979.^3 
Interest income grew at an annual growth rate of 
59-5 percent in 1976, up to $845,100 from the previous 
. 64 high in the preceding period. Interest income increased 
by 28.9 percent in 1978 over the previous year, reaching 
$1,252,500 at year end.*’3 Since much of the financial 
resources which LRDI relies upon must be raised externally, 
interest expense also grew quite rapidly, even at a rate 
exceeding the rate of increase in income. (Please refer 
to table 4, entitled Annual Growth Rates in Loans, In¬ 
terest Income and Interest Expense for the period 1974- 
82. ) 
Income and Compenstion 
There are two principal expense items : interest 
expense on borrowings and compensation of employees. In¬ 
terest expense is largely uncontrollable since the capital 
structure of LBDI and the nature of its operations neces¬ 
sitate reliance on borrowings or external sources of 
funds for any significant expansion in its lending opera¬ 
tions. Its cost structure would have been much greater if 
it had to'fund its loans through direct borrowing from 
6^LBDI, LBDI Annual Report, 1979 (Monrovia, Liberia 
Sabanoh Press, Ltd.,, n.d.), p. 22. 
^4LBDI, LBDI Annual Report, 1976 (Monrovia, Liberia 




ANNUAL GROWTH RATES IN LOANS, INTEREST INCOME AND INTEREST 















1974 $ 5,129.9 rl M $ 240.01 _ _ _ $ 167.0 — — — 
1975 7,056.3 37.6 530.0 120.7 408.8 144.8 
1976 9,729.0 37.9 845.1 59.5 604.3 47.8 
1977 10,363.0 6.1 971.6 15.0 520.0 52.2 
1978 12,769.1 23.2 1 ,-252. 5 28.9 9 82.0 6.7 
1979 15,740.5 23.3 1,509.0 20.5 1,552.0 58.0 
1980 18,726.0 20.0 1,866.0 23.7 1,733.0 11.7 
1981 18,716.0 -.05 1,928.0 3.3 1,749.0 0.9 
1982 20,246.0 8.2 2,162.8 12.2 1,830.0 4.6 
Source: The Liberian Bank for Development and Investment, Annual Reports, 
Audited Financial Statements, 1974-1982 (Monrovia, Liberia: Sabanoh Press, n.d.), 
p. 53. 
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private sources. Instead LBDI has received both interest 
free and soft loans from the government as well as from 
international lending institutions such as the World Bank, 
African Development Bank, Kreditanstalt Fur Wiederaufbau 
(KFW) and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). 
This situation cannot be expected to continue indefinitely. 
Hence, the bank needs to plan ahead now for alternative 
sources of funds. 
With respect to administrative expenses, the most 
significant component is compensation of employees. 
Details regarding this cost item are provived in table 5, 
entitled "Trends in Employees Compensation for Selected 
Ye rs, 1974-198?." It will be noted that in absolute terms, 
employees compensation increased from $105,700 to $261,100 
in 1977, and by 1982 aggregated some $917,500.Per¬ 
haps, the most interesting and critical point revealed in 
the analysis of the historical data is depicted in the 
growth rates per annum of totcil expenses and employees 
compensation. Referring to table 5, it is observed firstly 
that after declining significantly between 1974 and 1977 
from a high of 31.6 percent to only 19.4 percent as a pro¬ 
portion of total expenses, compensation paid employees has 
tended to increase both in absolute and relative terms at 
^LBDI, LBDI Annual Report, 1982 (Monrovia, Liberia: 
Sabanah Press, Ltd., ), p. 11. 
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TABLE 5 
TRENDS.IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION FOR SELECTED YEARS, 














in G&E Exp. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1974 $105.7 __ __ _ _ _ $ 334.4 31.6 
1975 143.0 +$ 37.3 35.3 657.0 21.0 49.1 
1976 205.4 • + 62.4 43.6 897.8 22.9 36.7 
1977 261.1 + 55.7 27.1 1,344.5 19.4 33.2 
1978 353.6 + 92.5 35.4 1,573.4 22.5 17.0 
1979 497.1 + 143.5 40.6 2,344.4 21.2 49.0 
1980 712.9 + 215.8 43.4 2,902.8 24.6 23.8 
1981 773.6 + 60.7 8.5 2,994.6 25.8 3.2 
mi— Jim  + 143.9      28.-4  8.0 
Average; 33—6£ 
Source: The Liberian Bank for Development and Investment, Annual Reports, 
1974-1982, Audited Financial Statements (Monrovia, Liberia: Sabanoh Press, n.d.), 57. 
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an increasing rate. Since 1978, the proportionate share 
of employees' compensation in the total cost structure 
of LBDI has increased from 22.5 percent to 28.4 percent 
6 7 
as of the end of fiscal 1982. The rising cost trend 
has its origin in the hyperinflationary period of the 197J0S, 
during which time the annual growth rate attained peaks of 
up to 43.6 percent as in 1976, and 43.4 percent again in 
6 8 
1980. Actually, personnel costs increased, on average, 
at a much faster growth rate than total expenses, e.g., 
69 
31.6 percent versus 27.5 percent per annum. Since, 
apart from interest costs, personnel costs are the most 
significant, management must, in the future, exercise con¬ 
trol or introduce measures which will ensure maximum utili¬ 
zation of its professional staff. 
Development Versus Profitability 
The issue of development versus profitability was 
raised after the first decade of the bank's operation when 
projects that were being financed or had been financed 
leaned considerably more toward profitability rather than 
development. While the bank was recruiting a professional 
staff, conducting training among other things, it could 
not afford, at the time, to undertake many long term, 
®7LBDI, LBDI Annual Report, 1982 (Monrovia, Liberia: 
Sabanoh Press, Ltd., n.d.), p. 13. 
6^LBDI, LBDI Annual Report, 1980 (Monrovia, Liberia: 
Sabanoh Press, Ltd., n.d.), p. 13. 
69Ibid. 
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high risk projects, Theref pre, the delay fn taking on 
these projects was not in accordance with the bank's object 
tiyes. Not until 1971, when the scope of the bank's acti¬ 
vities was expanded and its objectives broadened did LBDI 
begin to function as it was designed to do. It was during 
this time that the Government of Liberia assisted LBDI: by 
providing capital to help strengthen the institution's 
operating base. In addition, roost of these projects had 
to be revised to meet the standards of the bank. Develop- 
ment projects are often tiroes similar to development banks, 
in that they require a gestation period before some results 
can be seen. 
Established technically as a non-bank financial in¬ 
stitution, the bank is not a demand deposit taking insti¬ 
tution, nor does it accept saving deposits. Consequently, 
it must rely upon internally-generated funds flow or seek 
external long term debt sources as was discussed in the 
review of the literature. This has meant an increasing 
degree of reliance upon its ability to attract and mobi¬ 
lize foreign capital from traditional international sources 
such as the IFC, the World Bank Group and other relatively 
new sources such as the African Development Bank. 
The financial results indicate that the interest mar¬ 
gin since 1976 has shown an improvement, with the exception 
of 1979. Net margin or the relationship between net income 
56 
(NI) and total revenue (R), (NI/R x 100) was relatively 
stable during the four-year period, 1976-1979, averaging 
70 26.8 percent. The deterioration in net margins in 1980 
and 1981 represents the impact of the need to make extra¬ 
ordinary provisions for loan losses following the Military 
Coup of April 12, 1980. Despite charges against current 
income in those years, the bank actually earned operating 
profits of $590,894 and $554,111 in 1980 and 1981, respec- 
71 tively. Similarly, the bank has earned an acceptable 
return on capital, thanks to a leverage multiplier of six 
for the period 1974 to 1982. Thus, excepting the two-year 
period 1980 to 1981, LBDI has earned an average of 14.3 
72 
percent rate of return on equity and capital. Further 
details are provided in table 6, entitled Profitability 
Ratios/Measures for Selected Years, 1974 to 1982. 
Dividend Policy 
Reviewing the earnings in the early years, the board 
first declared dividends at the end of the 1974 financial 
year in the amount of $37,600 out of aggregate net earnings 
of $80,300, representing earnings per share of only 
73 $0.80. The dividend pay-out rate has fluctuated between 
70 
71 
LBDI, LBDI Annual Report, 1979, p. 18. 







PROFITABILITY RATIOS/MEASURES FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1974-1982 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980* 1981* 1982* 
Interest Margin 0.02 0.01 2.11 -0.27 0.71 0.96 1.64 
Net Margin (%) 16.2 29.0 28.1 26.4 28.93 23.58 (27.18) (4.2) 8.5 
Asset Utilization (%) 6.1 8.5 9.5 8.4 8.7 11.3 13.3 12.6 12.2 
Return on Assets (%) 2.5 1.0 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.7 (3.6)* (0.5)* 1.0 
Return on Capital (%) .214 . 068 13.9 14.1 14.7 14.3 (22.5)* (3.3)* 6.6 
Leverage Multiplier 8.6 6.7 5.2 6.4 5.9 5.4 6.2 6.3 6.4 
* The financial results for these years were greatly affected by the adverse impact of 
the military coup which occurred April 12, 1980. Extraordinary provisions for loan 
losses had to be made in the three year period 1980/1982. 
Source: The Liberian Bank for Development and Investment, Audited 
Financial Statements. 1974-1982 (Monrovia, Liberia: Sabanoh Press, n.d.), 
18. 
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a high of 46.8 percent in 1974 and 20.3 percent in 1976.74 
However, the dividend pay-out rate for the period 1974 to 
1979 has averaged 35.4 percent. The dividend policy of 
LBDI is partly restricted by the statutory reserves 
requirement which are mandated by the bylaws of the bank. 
Statutory reserves are set at 25 percent each year in which 
net profits are earned. Even though there is not at present 
any explicit statement of the bank's dividend policy, it 
can be deduced from the historical record. The dividend 
policy of the bank has been influenced in general by such 
factors as the level of profits, the stability and amount 
of cash flow, the lending or growth prospects of LBDI and 
the need to meet its external debt obligations. The divi¬ 
dend policy of the bank can be expressed in terms of what 
75 may be described as the "25-35-40 percent formula." That 
is net profits, whenever earned, are appropriated as fol¬ 
lows: statutory reserves 25 percent; 35 percent to divi- 
7 6 
dends, and 40 percent to retained earnings. 
The presence of private investors as shareholders 
in LBDI has exerted pressure on the board to declare divi¬ 
dends whenever operations have been profitable. This 








understandable since they expect to receive a return on 
their investments. However, this is one area of conflict ■ 
between private versus public ownership of such speci-L. 
alized development institutions. 
In addition, the financial and economic incentives 
'- 'which the government has provided LBDI, have also, by 
statutory provision, subordinated its legal rights to 
dividend payments until all other shareholders have received 
minimum cash dividend payments of at least 6.5 percent, 
provided current earnings are adequate in the financial 
year. That provision establishes a dividend threshold and 
ensures all private investors—both individuals and corpo¬ 
rate institutions—a minimum return on their investment in 
preference to the equitable rights of the^government. That 
provision confers defacto legal rights of preferred shares 
upon the common shares held by private investors vis-a-vis 
those held by GOL. Table 7, entitled Dividend Payment and 
Net Income for selected years provides complete historical 
data regarding cash dividend payments made by the bank.' 
Statutory Reserve Policy 
Since the IFC/World Bank was instrumental in the 
conceptualization stage of LBDI and gave technical and 
legal assistance in drafting the organic law under which the 
bank was incorporated, the question of reserves policy was 
partially written into the 1965 LBDI ^ct. Firstly, at the 
60 
TABLE 7 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Payout 
Rate 
1974 $ 37.6 $1,171.1 3.2 $ 80.3 46.8 100 $0.80 
1975 65.0 1,407.9 4.6 301.8 21.5 100 3.02 
1976 82.8 2,942.3 2.8 407.4 20.3 100 4.07 
1977 240.0 3,783.4 6.3 535.2 44.8 100 5.35 
1978 265.4 4,638.9 5.7 681.1 39.0 100 6.81 
1979 317.4 5,578.2 5.7 800.3 39.7 100 8.00 
1980 Nil 4,623.4 — (1,963.7)* — — — 
1981 Nil 4,546.6 — (76.8) — — — 
1982 Nil 4,868.5    321.9 — — — “ ~ “ 
* Operating income was $923, 915 but loss due to provision for loan loss on account of 
military coup of April 12, 1980. 
1974 a 5 percent dividend was paid which was increased to percent in 1975 on 
total number of shares outstanding. 
Source: The Liberian Bank for Development and Investment, Annual Reports, 
1974-1982 (Monrovia, Liberia: Sabanoh Press, n.d.), p. 18. 
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time, the Liherian financial system operated without a 
central monetary authority or central bank. Moreover, 
expatriate banks—local branches of American banks, i.e., 
Chase Manhattan and Citibank—operated practically without 
any local supervision. Secondly, it was recognized, on the 
basis of the operating experiences of other development 
banks in the Third world or developing countries, that 
losses and consequently erosion of the bank's capital were 
unavoidable risks requiring prudent action. In this con¬ 
nection, the business environment in which development 
banks operate in the Third World should be clearly under¬ 
stood and cannot be overemphasized in evaluating the per¬ 
formance of such institutions. Essentially, the socioeco¬ 
nomic and political milieu is a mine field of high risks 
and low profitability. Usually, it is the non-economic or 
financial risks which determine the success of failure of 
development banks. LBDI is going'through a critical 
period of adjustment and consolidation as an aftermath of 
the socioeconomic consequences of the military coup of 1980. 
To protect the capital base and provide a cushion 
against potential anticipated loan losses, the 1965 LBDI 
Act requires the maintenance of statutory reserves equiva¬ 
lent to 25 percent of net profits earned in each financial 
year. Despite this provision, the extraordinary adverse 
impact of the 1980 coup revealed the inadequacy of the 
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statutory reserves and the nominal additional reserves 
which had accumulated annually in accordance with deci¬ 
sions of the1 board. At worst, the reserve policy of the 
bank has been arbitrary, imprudent and evidently unrelated 
to the operational lending experience of the bank. Thus, 
there is a need to increase the level of special or addi- 
tonal reserves against potential loan losses. 
LBDI has attempted to improve its public image as an 
institution not for the wealthy and politically influential 
located in Monrovia, partly through its public relations 
activity and substantively in recent years by cosponsoring 
an affiliate organization—Small Enterprises Financing 
Organization (SEFO). In 1978, the board decided to estab¬ 
lish a special loan fund equivalent to 25 percent of unap¬ 
propriated profits (25 percent of 75 percent) for a period 
of five years for the purpose of extending retail loans to 
small scale enterprises whose sponsors could not provide 
adequate and or acceptable collateral in accordance with 
the normal standards of LBDI. 
In 1982, LBDI joined with the Agricultural and 
Cooperative Development Bank (ACDB) and the National Hous¬ 
ing and Savings Bank (NHSB) in subscribing to 10,000 
shares of common stock of SEFO with a par value of $10.00 
per share. SEFO became operational in 1982 and is re¬ 
portedly meeting the financing needs of small scale 
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business people—a market sector which LBDI was originally 
intended to serve. 
Equity Investment 
LBDI has also taken an equity position in only eight 
companies. Its portfolio investments have been practically 
unchanged since 1975, with one exception, i.e., its co¬ 
sponsorship of SEFO. This indicates both in absolute and 
relative terms, that the bank’s investment banking activi¬ 
ties have been minimal. There are several explanations for 
this low level of activity. Firstly, the bank has been 
overly cautious and conservative in its financing opera¬ 
tions. Clearly, the bank has shown a greater preference 
or predisposition for making loans since the degree of risk 
is not equally the same as equity investments. Secondly, 
the local market for common stocks is rather thin, and 
LBDI has not been aggressive enough in promoting the 
development of a local market which would enable the bank 
to revolve its investment portfolio. 
Concentration of LBDI Financing 
and Regionalization 
During the tenth anniversary of LBDI, an issue 
arose over the tendency of concentration of its financing 
activity in Monrovia, the capital. The bank then made a 
public pledge to reduce the extent of concentration by 
increasing its lending operations in other political 
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subdivisions of the country in comparison to its capital, 
Monrovia, which is in Montserrado County. The inescapable 
conclusion is that the geographical concentration of the 
bank's financing activities had become even more pronounced 
by 1982 than was the case, in 1975, despite the asserted 
objective of making the bank more accessible to other areas 
of the country, particularly the rural areas. The pattern 
of loan distribution appears to reflect the political com¬ 
position of the national government, with the seat of 
government always given primary consideration. It seems 
that politics rather than economics or finance has been a 
critical factor in the investment decision making process 
of LBDI. The geographical distribution of projects financed 
by LBDI has not changed significantly during the first 
twenty years of its existence. This fact tends to support 
the popular view that LBDI is too attuned to political con¬ 
siderations in its lending operations. Furthermore, the 
bank is not really a national institution, but rather a 
regional one in practice, with a pronounced orientation 
toward the political and national center. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since the lending process is a contributing factor 
to the growth of the bank, the following suggestions are 
being made by the writer to improve the entire process. 
While reviewing the lending process of the bank, and 
from the facts gathered during the analysis, it can be 
concluded that there has been a decrease in the number of 
loans made by the bank, as well as a deterioration in the 
loan quality standards which is strongly supported by evi¬ 
dence. This fact partly reflects the lack of an effectively 
organized and implemented loan review effort on the part of 
management in the past, even though it appears that ade¬ 
quate manpower has not been a limiting factor. The real 
reason is that LBDI has been too slow in adapting its insti¬ 
tutional structure and operating policies to changes in the 
business environment so as to meet its current and future 
needs. 
For instance, even though LBDI has been in existence 
for over a quarter of a century, it was not until compara¬ 
tively recently, that is, in 1982, that a Department of 
Supervision and Implementation was established. Post finan¬ 
cing supervision is critical to the successful implementa¬ 
tion of development projects, especially within an 
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environment of general underdevelopment, characterized by 
the general lack of experienced entrepreneurs and techni¬ 
cally qualified management. It is necessary that the bank 
be concerned with the execution of contractual agreements 
as well as with bank review and follow-up. Secondly, while 
the service of external professionals is always available, 
the high cost of such experts tends to inhibit management 
from pursuing alternative solutions to the technical man¬ 
power constraints due to the negative financial impact via 
higher operating costs. In terms of its actual activities, 
LBDI, on the whole, has operated under a set of inapprop¬ 
riate guidelines which were largely ignored operationally. 
The Government of Liberia has provided both finan¬ 
cial as well as economic incentives to LBDI. This was done 
in order to increase its financial returns and thereby 
attract potential investors—both local and foreign. 
Throughout its existence, the government has manifested 
keen interest in the affairs of the bank, and without whose 
continuing financial and moral support, it is likely the 
bank might even fail at worst. 
This brings up the question of politics and whether 
it influences the decisions of the bank. The degree of 
politics in the affairs of the bank has increased particu¬ 
larly since the military coup of April 1980. Since that 
profoundly socioeconomic and political upheavel, LBDI has 
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had three chief executive officers, two of whom had no 
previous professional banking experience whatsoever. 
In addition, there is not yet in place opera¬ 
tional and systematic loan review policy and procedures 
which would ensure that outstanding loans are regularly 
reviewed and corrective action promptly taken before the 
critical recovery threshold is reached or passed. The 
instability in senior management, and the absolute and rela¬ 
tive managerial inexperience tend to undermine the necessity 
for continuity and consistency in order to improve loan 
quality standards and the effectiveness of post financing 
review functions. 
Loan Policy Formulation Review 
The composition and quality of a bank's loan port¬ 
folio should be a reflection of its loan policy. The 
latter should serve to give management guidance and focus 
On the bank's lending activities. To ensure that such 
direction is clear and communicated to all concerned, the 
loan policy should be in written form. A written loan 
policy, therefore, should serve to facilitate the achieve¬ 
ment of three objectives: 
(1) To produce sound and collectible loans; 
(2) To provide profitable investment of bank 
funds ; 
(3) To encourage extensions of credit that 
meet the legitimate needs of the bank's 
market. 
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Loan policies may change over time. In addition, 
loan policies may also vary over time, partly to reflect 
changing national objectives and economic priorities. In 
periods of tight credit money, banks often have to restrict 
their loan growth. Clearly, the loan policy should be 
adaptable to change in both cyclical and secular circum¬ 
stances» In fact, it is crucial that loan policies be up¬ 
dated to reflect current circumstances and to maintain their 
relevance as a control tool in the developmental orientation, 
of the bank within the framework of the national development 
plans. 
Even though LBDI has had a written loan policy since 
the early 1960s, its policy has never been an integral part 
of or complementary to the national economic development 
plan. This fact is contrary to the usual pattern prevailing 
in developing countries in which the activities of their 
development bank or other similar specialized financial 
institution is integrated into the national financial plan. 
Two critical factors appear responsible for the peculiar 
position of LBDI. Firstly, unlike most development banks, 
ownership of LBDI is "mixed," private foreign interests and 
domestic public ownership. Secondly, Liberia is monetarily 
and financially dependent upon external sources. 
Another aspect of the lending process is loan 
review,. This is a crucial management tool in reducing 
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losses and in monitoring loan quality and performance. 
Specifically, the review function consists of a periodic 
audit of ongoing performance of some or all of the active 
loans in a bank's portfolio.- Other than its basic objec¬ 
tive of reducing loan losses, some intermediate objectives 
of the loan review should be as follows: 
(1) To detect actual or potential problem 
loans as early as possible; 
(2) To ensure uniform documentation; 
(3) To ênsure that loan policy is followed; 
(4) To inform management and the board about 
the overall condition of the loan port¬ 
folio. 
The following points should also be reinforced in order to 
have an effective loan review program: 
(1) Financial condition and repayment 
of borrower; 
ability 
(2) Completeness of documentation; 
(3) Consistency with loan policy; 
(4) Perfection of security interest on colla¬ 
teral (legal and regulatory compliance); 
(5) Apparent profitability; 
(6) Grace periods should be realistic, taking 
into consideration the realities of the 
economic conditions surrounding the project. 
If these suggestions are considered by LBDI, this should 
result in a noticeable change in the direction of the bank's 
lending process. 
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The intractable management and administrative prob¬ 
lems which plagued LBDI as observed by the writer, arose 
out of its excessively centralized organizational structure 
and partly out of the composition of its board. In other 
words, there were serious flaws in the organic structure 
of the bank and these deficiencies were further aggravated 
by personality clashes among board members. Secondly, in 
attempting to fulfill its two-fold role, the bank was sub¬ 
jected to external pressures, i.e,, politics and the demand 
for funds thus affecting the selection of projects to be 
financed. 
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